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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
CODY RY AN NELSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NOS. 47058-2019 & 47059-2019
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NOS. CR-2017-11587
& CRl0-18-12341
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cody Nelson appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion in ruling on his
motions for leniency under I.C.R. 35 ("Rule 35 motions") in these cases. Specifically, he asserts
the district court abused its discretion by not retaining jurisdiction in light of the new information
from a psychological evaluation which explained that treatment provided in the rider program
would best address Mr. Nelson's newly-diagnosed conditions, and that timely treatment would
likely lower the risk he presented to society. As such, this Court should remand this case with
instructions to retain jurisdiction. Alternatively, the should have reduced the fixed term of one of

1

his sentences to match the two-year fixed terms of his other sentences, thereby facilitating
timelier access to treatment during his period of incarceration.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
When Mr. Nelson's first wife died young, he, now a single father of four, did not take
time to deal with his grief (See 47058 PSI, p.12.) 1 However, he did remarry and had two more
children. (47058 PSI, p.10.) Nevertheless, he continued to struggle, continuing what he called a
downward spiral stemming from his first wife's death. (See 47058 PSI, p.10.) Those struggles
were highlighted by his attempt to shoplift a humidifier and some "vapo pad[ s]" for one of his
children, who was sick at the time, as well as a sink faucet, some lubricant, and two toilet seats. 2
(See 47058 R., p.20; 47058 PSI, p.5 (noting the total value of the property, including tax, was

$218.08).) He ultimately pled guilty to burglary. (See 47058 R., pp.60-66.) The district court
withheld judgment for a four-year period of probation. (47058 R., pp. 71, 74.)
The GAIN evaluation conducted at that time noted Mr. Nelson had some prior struggles
with drugs and alcohol but that both were in "Sustained Remission." (47058 PSI, p.19.) The
associated mental health examination report concluded Mr. Nelson did not present with any other
serious mental illnesses or mental health needs. (47058 PSI, p.31.) However, the presentence
report noted that he had been diagnosed with ADD and ADHD as a child, and he had
1

As the records and confidential exhibits in these cases were provided in two different volumes,
citations thereto will include the case number in which the file was provided. For example,
"47058 PSI" refers to the electronic file "Clerk's Confidential Record" provided in Docket No.
47058, and "47059 PSI" refers to the electronic file "Confidential Record" provided in Docket
No. 47059.
However, all the transcripts were provided in a single file with Docket No. 47058, so no
case number designation is included with citations to the transcripts. Since the transcript pages
are provided four-to-a-page, the internal transcript page numbers, and not the electronic page
numbers, are used in citations to the transcripts.
2
Mr. Nelson worked as an independent contractor doing roofing jobs, and was in the off-season
for that profession at the time of this incident[. (47058 PSI, pp.11-12.)
2

participated in special education and remedial classes as a result.

(4 705 8 PSI, p.11.)

He

explained he was still experiencing symptoms of those conditions, but he was not interested in
taking medications because of the way they had made him feel. (47058 PSI, pp.11-12.)
However, the situation was not as stable as it seemed. Mr. Nelson did not engage with
the counselling or other treatment programs recommended as part of his probation.

(See

Tr., p.69, Ls.20-25; 47058 R., p.78 (term 9 of his probation discussion participation in such
programs).) Instead, he appears to have suffered a relapse. (See Tr., p.11, Ls.21-24 (Mr. Nelson
admitting that his addiction to drugs and alcohol "played a major factor in some of the decisions
that I made").)3 That all culminated with Mr. Nelson fleeing from officers twice, and during the
first incident, officers discontinued the pursuit, as it was involving high speeds and several of
Mr. Nelson's children were in his car with him. (47058 R., pp.93-94; see also 47058 R., pp.81,
87 (discussing all the charges that Mr. Nelson received during the term of probation).)
Pursuant to a global plea agreement, Mr. Nelson agreed to plead guilty to three charges possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful taking of a big
game animal - as well as the associated violations of his probation, and in exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in this case as well as another case. (47058 R., pp.10407; 47059 R., pp.50-53; see Tr., p.24, Ls.3-18 (the prosecutor dismissing the original allegations
of probation violation and replacing them with an allegation based on his admissions to the new
charges).) The district court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,
for the new charges,4 and, after revoking Mr. Nelson's withheld judgment, it imposed a

3

Mr. Nelson continued to assert he had no mental health concerns at the new change of plea
hearing. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-11.)
4
The new aggregate sentence consisted of identical terms of five years, with two years fixed, on
the poaching and firearm charges, and a unified term of seven years, with two years fixed, for the
methamphetamine charge, all run concurrently with each other. (Tr., p.44, L.25 - p.45, L.9.)
3

concurrent unified term of ten years, with four years fixed, for the burglary charge. (Tr., p.61,
Ls.2-3, p.62, Ls.16-18.)
Mr. Nelson filed a Rule 35 motion in each case, and attached a copy of a new
psychological evaluation that had been conducted after the sentencing hearing. (See 47058
R., pp.116, 125-26; 47059 R., pp.66, 87-88.)

That evaluation diagnosed Mr. Nelson with

Borderline Personality Disorder, Stimulant Use Disorder, and a Specified Neurodevelopmental
Disorder associated with a “NVLD” [nonverbal learning disorder]. (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059
PSI, p.67.)

It explained that these conditions would be better treated with psychosocial

treatment, as opposed to biomedical treatment (i.e., counselling as opposed to medication).
(47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI, p.67.) Specifically, it recommended: “This defendant would
benefit from the opportunity for court ordered treatment either through a retained jurisdiction
program or specialty court participation.” (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI, p.67.)
The new evaluation explained that Mr. Nelson was now showing some level of readiness
to change and desire for treatment. (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI, p.67; compare 47058 PSI, p.12
(Mr. Nelson stating he did not need treatment and did not want to take medication for the
symptoms associated with his childhood diagnoses).) Additionally, the evaluator explained: “If
left to his own devices without the support, supervision, and services recommended above, he
will likely not be able to make significant changes when released to a community setting,” and
“it is unlikely that time served in and of itself will create the practical skills and insight necessary
to become a productive member of society.” (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI, p.67.)
In other words, “[h]is risk of reoffending without significant treatment and supervision is
high.” (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI, p.67.) However, “[w]ith effective treatment, the risk of
reoffending remains moderate within the first year. After a year of prosocial behavior in the

4

community and continued success with compliance to recommendations and treatment, the risk
would be reduced to low as treatment and support remain intact." (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059 PSI,
p.67.)
As such, Mr. Nelson requested the district court consider retaining jurisdiction over him
in both cases, as that would allow for immediate access to the necessary treatment programs.
(Tr., p.67, Ls.7-13.) Alternatively, he requested the district court reduce the fixed terms of his
burglary sentence to two years, as that would be more appropriate to the facts of the underlying
crime. (See Tr., p.68, Ls.1-9; compare 4 7059 R., p.60 (recording that the sentences in the new
case all had concurrent, fixed terms of two years).)
The district court specifically addressed the burglary sentence at the Rule 35 hearing,
explaining that, "if this would have been an original sentencing hearing on the burglary [as
opposed to following a withheld judgment], that sentence is a little heavier than the Court would
normally do." (Tr., p.81, Ls.2-5.) As such, it granted the Rule 35 motion in that case, changing
one year of the sentence from fixed to indeterminate time, meaning the burglary sentence was
now for a period often years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.84, Ls.11-14.)
However, it rejected the recommendation for treatment in the community (i.e., the
recommendation for participation in a specialty court)5 based on its consideration of the other
goals of sentencing besides rehabilitation. (See Tr., p.83, L.20 - p.84, L.7.) It also refused to
retain jurisdiction, recommending Mr. Nelson be put in "the 18-month program in prison" during
his period of incarceration instead. (Tr., p.84, Ls.22-25.) As a result, it denied the motion

5

At the most recent sentencing hearing, the prosecutor had noted that Mr. Nelson had been
staffed for participation in several specialty courts, but had been determined to be ineligible.
(Tr., p.45, Ls.23-25.) Additionally, at the Rule 35 hearing, defense counsel conceded that
probation was not a viable option at that time. (Tr., p. 70, Ls.11-16.)
5

entirely with respect to No. 47059, maintaining the initially-imposed sentence was appropriate. 6
(47059 R., p.91.) Mr. Nelson filed notices of appeal timely from the orders on his Rule 35
motions. (47058 R., p.93; 47059 R., p.131.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion in ruling on Mr. Nelson's Rule 35 motions.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ruling On Mr. Nelson's Rule 35 Motions
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to
act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, it fails to act consistently with applicable legal
standards, or fails to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider the

6

In the order denying the motion in No. 47059, the district court said: "The Defendant provided
no new information convincing the Court that the sentence should be reduced." (47059
R., p.91.) To the extent this might be read to be a denial of the motion based on the failure to
comply with the procedural requirement that a defendant present new or additional information
to support a Rule 35 motion, see State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007), that would, of course
be clearly erroneous, since Mr. Nelson presented the new psychological report with his motions
in both cases. If that were the case, it would constitute a sufficient and independent basis upon
which to remand this case.
6

recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were altered by the
new evidence Mr. Nelson presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. A failure to do so
should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982);
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209

(Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990).

In this case, the new information Mr. Nelson presented with his Rule 35 motion made it
clear that a period of retained jurisdiction would best serve all the goals of sentencing: "This
defendant would benefit from the opportunity for court ordered treatment either through a
retained jurisdiction program or specialty court participation," 7 since "[w ]ith effective treatment,
the risk of reoffending remains moderate within the first year. After a year of pro social behavior
in the community and continued success with compliance to recommendations and treatment, the
risk would be reduced to low as treatment and support remain intact." (47058 PSI, p.59; 47059
PSI, p.67.) In other words, delaying Mr. Nelson's access to treatment programs until he is
eligible for parole only serves to force the prison system to continue detaining him past the point
where rehabilitation would have reduced the risk of recidivism to the point he could be released
back into the community, which is improper. See State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App.
1988); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reaffirming that the timing of
rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at sentencing); Cook, 145 Idaho at 48990 (same).
The alternative of reducing the fixed term of the sentence helps some in this regard, but
not as much as the period of retained jurisdiction. That is because the Department of Correction,
7

During the Rule 35 hearing, trial counsel conceded that probation was not an appropriate option
at this point in time. (Tr., p.70, Ls.11-16.)
7

in its discretion, can simply require a person to serve out the entirety of his sentence, in which
case, there would not be rehabilitative programming offered in anticipation of a parole date. See
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). As such, the sentence which would best serve all the

goals of sentencing is one which included a period of retained jurisdiction. That sentence would
still address the concerns of deterrence and punishment because Mr. Nelson would be
incarcerated during the period of retained jurisdiction, and if he did not perform satisfactorily,
the district court could relinquish jurisdiction. (See Tr., p.83, L.20 - p.84, L.7 (the district court
voicing concerns about whether the recommendations from the psychological evaluation would
effectively account for the other objectives of sentencing).
At the very least, the district court should have further reduced the fixed term of the
burglary sentence to match the fixed terms of his other sentences, and in so doing, more timely
trigger his parole eligibility and potentially start access to the treatment program. See Nice, 103
Idaho at 91 (reaffirming that the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important
consideration at sentencing); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90 (same). Such a term would also more
accurately reflect the nature of the burglary charge itself (See Tr., p.68, Ls.1-9.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with instruction for the
district court to retain jurisdiction over Mr. Nelson, or alternatively, to reduce the fixed term of
the burglary sentence to two years.
DATED this 29 th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29 th day of November, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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